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In this article, we analyse empirically the factors that allowed for the improvement and 
strengthening of the banking systems in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain (known as 
the PIIGS) during the post-financial crisis period 2011-2016.  
 
We use panel data on 200 banks and measure their financial soundness using the z-score. Our 
results show that the improvement is mainly due to managerial factors. To ensure stability, 
banks must monitor their loans and avoid non-performing loans.  
 
The public authorities should try to control banks’ size, encouraging medium-sized banks since 
these tend to perform better on average while limiting the existence of banks, whose size and 
importance (despite economies of scale) can destabilize the entire system in case of 
bankruptcy.  
 
Finally, different from previous studies, we include herein the refinancing programmes into 
the analysis of financial soundness and show that the financial assistance programs have been 
necessary to ensure the recovery of the banking systems. 
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During the last decade, European banking systems took a downward economic turn, 
especially in some south European countries and Ireland, which previously was 
considered as the model of economic growth in Europe. Their banking systems and 
more broadly their economies were highly developed and in the constant expansion: 
for example, in 2007, real GDP growth of these countries stood between 1.4% (Italy) 
and 5.2% (Ireland), paired with high credit growth and supported by a real-estate 
sector bubble. 
 
After the subprime crisis and ensuing economic slowdown in 2008-09, these countries 
saw a breakdown of their economic models and a collapse in their banking systems. 
They had to support significant losses, reporting their illiquid position and for some 
of them their insolvency. This crisis highlighted the financial weakness of these 
countries and the importance of a well-functioning financial system to ensure 
economic growth. This period has been characterized by many bank failures and 
involved a number of mergers. A bank failure refers to a situation in which the 
excessively rising liquidity, credit, interest rate, or exchange-rate risk pushes the bank 
to suspend the internal convertibility of its liabilities. If the bank-failure problem 
undermines an entire banking system, then the crisis turns out to be systemic. This 
is what happened in the countries considered in our sample. This weakened the 
confidence and relationship of/between banks and their customers/banks.  
 
During the period 2000 to 2018, there was a high level of financial stress in all the 
countries sampled in this study, specifically Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain, 
known also as the PIIGS countries (European Central Bank, 2018). To avoid systemic 
risk, governments bailed-out the banking system, increasing their own debt. Therefore, 
the financial markets lost trust in these countries (Thalassinos et al., 2012; 2015). 
 
In 2010, these Europeans countries entered a new crisis, the so-called “sovereign debt 
crisis”. The risk-premiums of the States rose until it became very difficult for them to 
face commitments to creditors, and some faced the risk of default. Greece, for 
example, could not finance itself on the markets anymore. This risk was passed on to 
the banking system because of their premium risk since the lender of last resort was 
also brought close to a default situation. Uncertainty reigned in these sovereign 
economies. During this period, the banking sectors and the economies were weak and 
unstable, with very high rates of unemployment, a sharp increase in the cost of 
borrowing for households as for corporates, an expansion of the ratio “public debt on 
GDP" and a huge rise in the interest rate on sovereign bonds (European Central Bank, 
2018b; Grima, 2012; Grima and Caruana, 2017). 
 
These difficulties in their domestic banking sector and in the public finances forced 
governments to ask for help from the international community to avoid the risk of 
insolvency. In response, the international institutions (IMF, ECB, European 
Commission) intervened to prevent their far-reaching effects on the private sector and 
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more generally on the entire economy. The Eurozone created a specific temporary 
crisis resolution mechanism, called the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), 
which provided financial assistance to Ireland, Greece and Portugal. The goal was to 
substitute the financial markets, lending money at defined interest rates and especially 
with very long maturities. 
 
The aim to strengthen these countries was a mandatory step to then improve the 
banking situation. The eurozone members formed the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM), which created a European fund to help countries who need it, but at the same 
time to reassure the financial markets, encouraging countries to carry out liberal 
reforms in their economy. These bailouts cost billions of euros and put the receiving 
countries in a deficit situation for the coming decades. 
 
Nowadays, the recovery of these economies seems to be improving and the 
expectations of exiting this crisis is rising, driven by the regrowth indicators. These 
indicators include a declining unemployment rate, coupled with a high increase in credit 
growth, which seems to have stabilized after the bubble burst. However, borrower 
soundness can be questioned, and this raises the question of the fundamentals in which 
the regrowth is taking place and of the long-term sustainability at a macroeconomic 
level. Nevertheless, regarding the banking systems, the improvement seems to be real. 
The profitability of banks, measure as the Return on Assets (ROA), appears to increase 
and become positive or close to zero and above all less volatile (Figure 1). 
 
Our focus in this article is on the evolution of the banking sectors of these five 
countries since they seem to be at the root of the European crisis and had repercussion 
on the global economy. It is interesting to understand how the banks in these countries, 
which were on the verge of an implosion, seem to have become stronger and their 
balance sheet stabilized. However, the issues are not totally solved, and some 
weakness remains as shown by the failure of the ECB’s stress test by the Italian bank 
“Monte Dei Paschi” or the bankruptcy of the “Banco Popular” in Spain, purchased 
last year by the “Banco Santander” for the symbolic price of one-euro. 
 
Figure 1. Return on Assets Per Country. Source: European Central Bank, 2018 
Consolidated Balance Sheets – Statistics of The European Central Bank 
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We aim to highlight the determinant factors that have helped to bring the banking 
system out of this crisis. In doing this, as noted above, we assess the financial 
soundness of the five European countries (PIIGS) over the period 2011-2016. As a 
proxy of the financial soundness, we use the ‘Z-score’ to measure the bank’s distance-
to-default. This risk measure was derived from the concept of a bank’s default 
probability. We then investigate empirically the endogenous factors of banks and the 
exogenous factors to each banking sector or to each country and their impact on the z-
score. The analysis is conducted in three parts. First on the entire sample with the five 
countries, then on three of these countries, Italy, Portugal and Spain to highlight their 
own characteristics. Then we focus on the four countries which have received financial 
assistance, to highlight the role of these assistance programs in the strengthening of 
the banking systems. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis 
 
Various authors have tackled the subject of financial soundness and have investigated 
the determinants of bank’s profitability. Some empirical studies are country specific 
such as that of Trujillo-Ponce (2013,) while others such as Căpraru and Ihnatov (2014) 
focus on a panel of countries. Although these authors make use of various instruments 
to measure the financial soundness, we decided to use the traditional measure of the 
z-score, i n  accordance with Uhde and Heimeshoff (2008, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Huizinga (2001) and Dima et al. (2014) and assume that the return on Assets (ROA) 
is a random, normally-distributed variable (Lapteacru, 2017). We used the z-score 
ratio as our proxy to financial default, as a measure of the bank’s distance-to-default. 
 
According to previous studies, the factors determining the financial soundness of a 
banking system fall into three main groups: (1) the determinants specific to each bank, 
which result from managerial decisions - this group includes asset structure, 
capitalization, efficiency, size, interest management, financial structure and revenue 
diversification; (2) factors related to the banking industry of each country, such as the 
size of this market and the concentration; (3) the macroeconomic environment with such 
factors as inflation, economic growth and interest rates. 
 
2.1 Determinants specific to each bank  
 
At first, we will describe the different independent variables that we use and their 
previous use in the literature. 
 
2.1.1 Asset structure: To measure the impact of the asset structure on the financial 
soundness we used loans. Specifically, we took the total of loans, which regroup loans 
to customers and loans to other banks. A larger proportion of loans in the bank’s 
portfolios is commonly coupled with a greater liquidity risk arising from the incapacity 
of banks to accommodate decreases in liabilities or to fund increases on the assets side 
of the balance sheet. The higher the value of loans, the less liquid are the banks. During 
our period of study, we can observe a wide decrease in the number of loans to 
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households and corporates, expected in Italy, after the bubble burst of 2008. The 
amount of credit seems to stabilize around a pre-crisis level (European Central Bank, 
2018). 
 
Trujillo-Ponce (2012), Căpraru and Ihnatov (2014) and also Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Huizinga (1999) used the loans to take into account the asset structure. According to 
these previous studies, there is a positive relationship between the relative percentage 
of loans in the assets and profitability. At the same time, this relative percentage raise 
the liquidity risk, which can worsen the financial soundness. Therefore, we take the 
assumption of the ambiguous effects of the asset structure on financial soundness. 
2.1.2 Asset Quality: It appears that the banks' soundness is directly related to the 
quality of the assets, related to credit risk. Poor credit quality should have a negative 
effect on bank profitability. The subprime crisis with its excess of doubtful mortgage 
is a good example of this relationship. The relationship between asset quality and 
profitability is owed to the fact that an increase in doubtful assets requires a bank to 
allocate a portion of its margin to provision to cover expected credit losses, which will 
decrease profitability. 
 
De Young and Rice (2003) examine the determinants of the financial performance of 
US commercial banks, finding a positive relationship between the asset quality and the 
performance of banks. In contrast, Trujillo-Ponce (2012), in his study on the 
profitability of Spanish banks, shows a negative relationship between asset quality and 
profitability. It is argued that, according to Mester (1996), higher loan quality typically 
implies more resources dedicated to loan monitoring and credit underwriting. Besides 
this, riskier loans should receive a higher remuneration, which can increase the 
profitability, but not necessarily the financial soundness of banks. These arguments 
mitigate our first idea and can let us expect the ambiguous effects of asset quality. 
 
2.1.3 Capitalization: There appears to be a consensus that the cost of equity is one of 
the most expensive bank liabilities. In the banking literature, it is often argued that 
higher equity requirements increase funding cost because capital is risky and requires 
a high return. That could explain why banks managers don’t show a high interest to 
increase it in order to respect capital adequacy as the Basel III accords recommend. 
Nevertheless, they emphasize that a too high ratio “equity/asset” can be damaging for 
the banks’ financial viability caused by the opportunities costs. 
 
However, there are different reasons to believe that banks with higher equity should 
be stronger and show higher soundness. Angbazo (1997) just as Berger (1995) show a 
positive relation between financial soundness and well-capitalized banks. They argued 
that a well-capitalized bank experiences lower bankruptcy cost according to the 
bankruptcy cost hypothesis. A bank undercapitalized will face higher cost by higher 
interest expenses and can expect bankruptcy cost to be relatively high. Abreu and 
Mendes (2002) also agree on this latter conclusion on. Several empirical studies Bashir 
(2000), Abreu and Mendes (2002) and Ben-Naceur (2003) highlight that good equity 
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adequacy exerts a stimulant effect on bank profitability. The measure of the equity 
into the balance sheet enables us to consider the insolvency risk. 
 
The literature about capitalization is abundant. Among the different studies, we can 
mention Berger (1995), Abreu and Mendes (2002), Dima et al. (2014), Căpraru and 
Ihnatov (2014) and Climent Serrano (2014). Through these studies, we can 
hypothesize that there is a positive relationship between the amount of a bank’s equity 
and financial soundness. 
 
2.1.4 Financial structure: Banks have different channels to finance themselves. They 
can have sourced from the wholesale markets or customers deposits. The former gives 
banks larger flexibility in their financial structure, but they face higher cost, while the 
latter is a cheap and stable financial resource. Therefore, we herein decide to examine 
the relationship between customers’ deposits and financial soundness. In agreement 
with Trujillo-Ponce (2013), we can expect a positive relationship between these two 
features. 
 
Despite this, we raise the questions of the contrary effect. In a situation of “deposit-
war”, banks must attract deposits from competitors which are done through the 
remuneration of these deposits, increasing the interest rates. The latter has cut bank 
margins down. Following the beginning of the crisis, most of the banks’ premiums of 
these countries increased. Facing difficulties to access the international funding 
markets, banks turned themselves to customers’ deposits which became essentials. In 
this context, we can expect a negative relationship between customer deposits and 
financial soundness. Therefore, given this point, we expect the ambiguous effect of 
the customers' deposits. 
 
2.1.5 Efficiency: During the last three decades, advances infinancial services and 
managerial techniques have allowed banks to improve their services most efficiently. 
As a consequence, the cost to income ratio has been declining. We used this as a proxy 
for operational efficiency, in agreement with the methods used by Căpraru and Ihnatov 
(2014) and Trujillo-Ponce (2013). The cost-to-income ratio is commonly used in the 
banking literature to estimate bank efficiency. It is computed as follows: 
Cost-to-income ratio = Operating expenses / Operating 
Incomes 
 
Previous studies such as the ones mentioned above find a positive and significant 
relationship between efficiency and financial soundness. This implies a negative sign 
for the coefficient of the cost-to-income ratio. The coefficients are mainly very 
significant, which signify that to strengthen the financial system it is necessary to have 
operational efficiency. Trujillo-Ponce (2013) argued, in agreement with Berger 
(1995), that “managerial ability in controlling costs is much more important than 
economies of scale and scope.” Therefore, we examine the relationship between 
efficiency and financial soundness in our five countries sample. Here we take the 
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hypothesis of a positive link between the two previous features. 
 
2.1.6 Size: It is widely argued that the effect of size could be non-linear. In the 
beginning, the increase of the size will raise the profitability until an inflexion point 
where the profitability will be declining. That is to suppose medium scale banks are 
more profitable than smaller or larger banks. Then we can envisage the average cost 
curve with a flat U-shape, in agreement with Athanasoglou et al. (2008) and De Young 
and Rice (2003). 
At the same time, we must consider economies of scale and scope. A larger size may 
imply a decrease in costs related to the bank's services. Despite this, Barros et al. (2007) 
underline that larger banks are more likely to have lower performance, implying that 
smaller banks can achieve better performance reducing the asymmetric information 
problems inherent to banking activity. Furthermore, larger banks are prone to take more 
risk, influenced by the moral hazard argument that they are “too big to fail”. In principle, 
we would expect higher soundness for larger banks which experience higher 
profitability through the economy of scale. However, as explained above, under a 
certain threshold, diseconomies of scale can appear which can transform the advantage 
of size into a disadvantage. Therefore, in agreement with the explanations above, we 
see the relationship between the size and the financial soundness as ambiguous. 
 
2.1.7 Revenue diversification: As we know, the traditional role of banks has been 
changing during the past decades. The traditional activities of deposit and lending 
which consists in making a profit on the interest rates are not the main sources of 
revenues as before. Banks had been forced to find new sources of revenues to maintain 
their profitability. Elsas et al. (2010) show that banks moved their activity to diversify 
their revenues into fee-based businesses. However, this area is subject to strong 
competition between banks to be attractive to customers. Therefore, they extended 
their activities into new trading activities, but also by underwriting insurance contracts. 
This phenomenon is even more bitter in a context of low-interest rate, which puts 
pressure on the operating margin. 
In agreement with Elsas et al. (2010), who state that revenue diversification improves 
the profitability and then the soundness, increasing the margin from non-interest 
activities, we decided to make the hypothesis of a positive relationship between the 
revenue diversification and the financial soundness. 
 
2.1.8 Interest incomes and expenses: We also decided to include in our analysis the 
impact of the interest expenses and incomes to consider the characteristics of the bank 
traditional activity. Previous studies consider the interest margin, such as studies by 
Uhde and Heimesshoff (2009), Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) and Özen et al. 
(2018). In our study, we separate the interest expenses and the interest incomes to 
understand better if the improvement of the financial soundness came from an increase 
of incomes or a decrease in expenses. Knowing that we make the hypothesis of a 
negative relationship between interest expenses and financial soundness and the 
opposite hypothesis between interest incomes and financial soundness. 
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2.2 Determinants concerning the banking industry 
 
2.2.1   Banking Industry concentration and Size: The aim of higher market shares for 
their banks, lead bankers to have greater benefits owed to the market power. In this 
way, a more concentrated market will favor banks’ profitability. Moreover, a 
concentrated market means also a lower competition which can increase the benefits 
from customers’ deposits (as mention above in point 2.1.4). Furthermore, as 
mentioned before, efficiency is very important in reducing the cost structure. Then 
better-managed banks will see their market shares increase leading to higher 
concentration. None of the countries of our sample shows a too high market 
concentration during the period (European Central Bank, 2018). Empirical evidence 
from Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2001) but also from Rouabah (2006) and 
Beckman (2007) show that a lower concentration is assimilated with lower 
profitability. On the other hand, Berger (1995) find an opposite relation between 
concentration and profitability. Nevertheless, we decided to make the hypothesis of a 
positive relationship between concentration and financial soundness. Udhe and 
Heimeshoff (2009) argued that larger monopolistic banks in concentrated banking 
markets may reduce financial fragility by providing higher “capital buffers” that can 
protect them against external chocs. In agreement with these previous studies, we 
assume of a positive relationship between market concentration and financial 
soundness. 
 
The size of the banking industry in the whole economy, which measures the shares of 
the banking in an economy, could be an important determinant of the financial 
soundness. In agreement with Miguélez (2018) a too wide banking industry can be 
prejudicial for the financial soundness of the banking system. Then we decide to 
assume of a negative effect between the size of the banking sector and the financial 
soundness. 
 
2.3 Macroeconomics determinants 
 
In order to capture macroeconomic developments that are likely to affect the bank 
balance sheet and in turn the financial soundness, we chose the following measures: 
refinancing interest rates, the GDP per Capita, the rate of real GDP growth, the annual 
change of inflation and the interest rate on sovereign bonds. 
 
2.3.1 Inflation: The measure of inflation is commonly used in the analysis of the 
financial soundness of the banking systems. There is a financial nexus between banks 
profitability and inflation. Inflation can affect banks costs, as the salaries. 
Furthermore, inflation is very important for banks and their management of the 
interest rate. This factor is probably associated with the higher realization of net 
interest margins. If the inflation is fully anticipated, banks managers will transmit it 
to the interest rates. If the latter is adjusted accordingly, the bank can increase revenues 
faster than cost, which should be beneficial for the profitability (Trujillo-Ponce, 2013). 
In the case of partial anticipation of inflation, banks can expect losses. Using the 
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assumption that bank have good anticipation of inflation, we make the hypothesis of a 
positive relationship between inflation and financial soundness, congruent with Uhde 
and Heimeshoff (2009), Capraru and Ihnatov (2014) and Dima et al. (2014). 
 
2.3.2 GDP Growth: The rate of growth of the GDP is a control variable since the 
banks’ investment opportunities may be correlated with business cycles. Under an 
economic boom, all sectors of the economy are growing including the banking 
industry. Therefore, investment opportunities should arise. This slope of the cycle is 
commonly related with an increase of credit demand. Moreover, borrowers’ solvency 
may be higher which improves assets quality. In agreement with most of the previous 
banking literature on financial soundness, Uhde and Heimeshoff (2009), Trujillo-
Ponce (2013), we make the hypothesis of a positive relation between financial 
soundness and the rate of growth of the GDP.  
 
2.3.3 GDP per Capita: In order to capture the wealth of the country and its 
development, we decided to include GDP per capita, which serves as a proxy for 
income per head within a country. This measure seems to be more realistic than just 
the measure of the GDP, which can increase in value but decrease in value per capita 
and will fluctuate according to country size. This measure has been previously used in 
different articles such as those by, Udhe and Heimeshoff (2009) and Căpraru and 
Ihnatov (2014). We expect a positive relationship between this measure of the 
development and the financial soundness in banking systems. 
 
2.3.4 Interest rates: The interest rates are divided into two parts. The interest rate on 
refinancing operation for banks, and the interest rate on the sovereign bonds, which 
affect the banking interest rates. 
 
2.3.4.1 Interest rate on banking refinancing operation: Nowadays European banks 
perform in a context of low-interest rates. Coupled with a high rate of competition, 
banks are limited to set the appropriate rates on their credits and deposits. As explained 
above (see part 2.1.7), this creates pressure on the operating margin of banks. Despite 
this, Demirgüg-Kunt and Huizinga (1999), Molyneux and Thornton (1992) and 
Trujillo-Ponce (2013) highlight that there is a positive relationship between interest 
rate and profitability, hence financial soundness too. In agreement with these authors, 
we do the hypothesis of a positive relationship between the interest rate and the financial 
soundness. 
 
2.3.4.2 Interest sovereign rate: We decided to use another interest rate concerning the 
sovereign debt. In Spain, in May 2012, the government announced a debt-financed 
recapitalization of the undercapitalized Spanish banking system. Both banks’ CDS and 
sovereigns’ CDS increased higher than was expected when for the former a decrease 
was expected. Recapitalized banks faced higher CDS while higher sovereign debt 
discount deteriorated the fiscal position of the Spanish government (Van der Kwaak 
and Van Wijnbergen, 2017). In agreement with this event, we decide to add the interest 
rate on sovereign bond to our analysis. Moreover, as explained in the previous part, 
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there is a relation between the sovereign soundness (which can be measured through 
the interest rate on sovereign bond) and the financial soundness. In agreement with 
that, a negative relationship between the interest rate on sovereign bonds and financial 
soundness of banking systems is expected. If the situation of a country deteriorates 
(increase in the sovereign interest rates), the situation of banks will too (decrease in the 
financial soundness). 
 
2.3.4.3 Bailouts: This period in the Eurozone has been characterized by several 
assistance programmes for different countries, including four countries in our sample, 
Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. Get trapped into the financial crisis and then into 
the sovereign debt crisis, these countries asked for international help. IMF and the 
European institutions came to rescue these countries under specific conditions regarding 
their economies. In June 2010, the European institutions created the European 
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), as a temporary crisis resolution mechanism by 
euro area countries. The assistance was financed via bonds and other debts instruments 
on capital markets. Nowadays, most of the programmes are still in the application, or at 
least these countries continue to repay the loans. We include the refinancing 
programmes into the analysis of financial soundness. The expected relationship 
between the refinancing programs and the financial soundness is a positive 
relationship, as these programmes were made to strengthen the financial sector. 
Empirical Analysis 
 
2.4 Data Captured 
 
2.4.1 Sample: We use yearly data for 200 banks from five countries of the eurozone 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain for the period 2011-2016. We eliminated 
banks for which less than four consecutive year data was available and the ones for 
which information wasn’t available for all of the variables analysed. Our Banks’ balance 
sheet data was collected using Bankscope. 
 
2.4.2 Dependent variable: We use as the dependent variable the z-score ratio. We 
employ it as a measure of the bank’s distance to default, which is our proxy for the 
financial soundness. “This risk measure was conceived from the concept of a bank’s 
default probability” Lapteacru (2017). The z-score ratio is computed as follows: 
 
z-score = CAR +E(ROA) 
(𝑅OA) 
 
where CAR is the capital on assets ratio and ROA the return on assets. E(ROA) 
represents the expected value of ROA and 𝜎(𝑅OA) the standard deviation of ROA. We 
are conscious of the shortcoming owed to this measure of the traditional z-score raised 
by Lapteacru (2016). Therefore, we assume of normal distribution for ROA.  
 
2.4.3   Independent variables: Our aim is to analyse which determining factors 
allow the strengthening of the banking systems of our sample during our period of 
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study. As mentioned in section II, banking literature considers three categories of 
factors that determine bank’s soundness: bank-specific factors (loans, size, financial 
structure, credit risk, bank efficiency, bank capitalization, revenue diversification, 
liquidity risk, capital structure) ; industry-specific (concentration, size of the banking 
industry) ; and macroeconomic factors (inflation, rate of growth of real GDP, GDP per 
capita, interest rates). 
 
To analyse the effect of the asset structure on the financial system of the banking 
systems we use loans to total assets ratio. We considered it as a proxy of the liquidity, 
which indicates the shares of the loans into the total asset structure. The higher the value 
of this ratio, the less liquid the bank. Nonetheless, a higher ratio should increase 
profitability but also increase the liquidity risk. We carry out a linearization of this 
ratio through the logarithm function. 
 
To analyse whether the effect of asset quality on financial soundness is positive or 
negative we use the loan loss provision. This feature gives us the provision for 
impairment losses in the banks’ portfolios. An increase in this value indicates a 
worsening in the quality of the loan assets, which correspond to lower asset quality. 
The natural logarithm is used to measure the asset quality. 
 
In order to examine whether the capitalization of banks is a determining factor of 
financial soundness, we use the equity to total assets ratio. This ratio is commonly 
used is the banking literature as it gives the proportion of equity in the balance sheet 
in order to measure the capitalization. Our expectations are that a higher capitalization 
should be coupled with higher financial soundness. As for the previous variables, we 
use the logarithm function. 
 
To analyse the effect of the financial structure, as mentioned above, we use the 
customer deposits, but as a ratio using the total assets as the denominator. We know 
that customer deposits represent a stable and not expensive resource compared with 
other financial alternatives, however, a “deposit war” context could be detrimental for 
the bank strength. Hence, we do the hypothesis of an ambiguous relation with our 
dependent variable. The customer deposit is also linearized through the logarithm 
function. 
 
As a proxy of the efficiency in banks, we use the cost to income ratio, to see if banks 
that are more efficient have higher soundness. This ratio is the relation between 
operating expenses and operating incomes. This ratio measures the running cost as a 
percentage of income.  
 
As it is commonly used in the banking literature, we use the natural logarithm of the 
total bank assets as a proxy of the size of the bank. For the reasons mentioned above, 
the economies of scale which can turn in diseconomies in case of too large banks, 
which are not as easy to manage as medium or smaller banks. We expect ambiguous 
effects of the size on financial soundness. 
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To measure the characteristics referring to the effect of diversification of income we 
use the natural logarithm of the ratio “non-interest income / operating revenues”. We 
use it in order to capture the transformation operated by banks in their activity to 
diversify income. 
 
Finally, to measure the last of the bank-specific characteristics, the interest incomes 
and expenses we use for the former the ratio interest incomes on average interest-
earning liabilities asset, and for the latter the ratio interest expenses on average interest-
bearing liabilities. Both are log-linearized. 
 
Several measures of the banking concentration are usually used in the banking 
literature. We can mention the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) industry 
concentration or the shares of the five largest banks in the banking industry of each 
country. An easier measure, which can be also used, is the ratio of banks’ total assets 
on the banking industry total assets. We did regression with these three measures of 
the concentration. After different analysis, we decided to keep the HHI measure, which 
presents the best results and the fewer shortcomings. This measure seems also to be 
the most commonly used in the literature to measure concentration. The statistics of 
the European Central Bank provide a measure of this index. 
 
In order to estimate the effect of the size of the banking industry on the financial 
soundness, we compute the ratio of banking industry total assets on GDP. Data of 
banking industry total assets was downloaded from the Datastream (Eikon) platform. 
The GDP data was downloaded from the World Development Indicators (WDI) 
provided by the World Bank. 
 
The first macroeconomics-determining factor used is inflation. We measure its effect 
through the annual inflation rate (GDP deflator). As discussed previously, we expect a 
positive effect between the inflation and our dependent variable. We extract these data 
from the database of the World Development Indicators. 
 
As mentioned in the literature reviews, we decide to include the growth rate of the 
real GDP (Gross Domestic Product). We expect a positive effect of the GDP growth 
on the financial soundness. Additionally, in our study, we use the GDP per Capita, 
which could be a more realistic measure of the economic growth in a country and of 
the wealth. Both indicators come from the WDI database. 
 
To analyse whether the way in which the quantity of liquidity affects the financial 
soundness of the banking system we use the interest rate on the main refinancing 
operations (MRO) of the European Central Bank. In addition, to test the hypothesis that 
the sovereign debt has a negative relationship with the financial soundness, we use the 
interest rate on 10-year sovereign bonds in each country, provided by Datastream 
(Eikon). For the latter measure, we use the log-linearization function. 
 
For the third part of our analysis where we try to highlight the effects of the financial 
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assistance, we include this measure taking the data from the European Stability 
Mechanism web page. As amounts come in tranches and we use annual data, we take 
the sum of the amount received per year. We use the natural logarithm for the measure 




We first, carry out simple OLS regressions on the bank-specific factors and then add the 
industry and macroeconomic factors. As our study is based on panel data, we carry out 
a fixed-effect regression and then a random-effect regression. Following the analysis, 
we proceed to a Hausman test, in order to find the specialization of the model. We 
estimate the following equation: 
 
Here, subscripts i, k and t index banks, countries and time in years, respectively, represents the 
z-score ratio as our measure of financial soundness. 𝛽 coefficients are related with the 
bank-specific factors, 𝛿 coefficients with the industry-specific factors and 𝛾 with the 
macroeconomic factors.  𝜀𝑖, is an error  term.  The component V captures the  
remaining disturbance that is assumed to be uncorrelated over time. TA represents 
the banks’ total assets. 
 
Table 1. Explanatory Variables and Expected Signs 
Explanatory Variables Description Expected 
signs 
Bank-Specific factors: 
Total loans / Total 
assets, log 
Measure of the asset 
structure 
( +/- ) 
Loan loss provision / 
Total assets, log 
A measure of the 
credit quality 
( +/- ) 
Equity / Total assets, log Capitalization ( + ) 
Customer deposits / Total 
assets, log 
A measure of the 
financial structure 
( +/- ) 
The cost to income ratio A measure of the 
efficiency 
( - ) 
Total assets, log A measure of the size (+/-) 
Non-interest income / 
operating revenues, log 
Revenue 
diversification 
( + ) 
Interest income / Average 
interest earning assets, 
log 
Measure the interest 
revenue 
( + ) 
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Interest expense/Average
 interest bearing 
liabilities, log 
Measure the interest 
expenses 
( - ) 
Banking industry factors: 
Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index 
A measure of the 
concentration 
( + ) 
Banking Industry total 
assets / GDP 
Size of the sector ( - ) 
Macroeconomic factors: 
GDP deflator, % Measure the inflation ( + ) 
Rate growth real GDP, % Measure the Economic 
Growth 
( + ) 
GDP per capita Measure the wealth 
and development 
( + ) 
Rate main refinancing 
operation, % 
Measure the cost of 
refinancing at the ECB 
( + ) 
The interest rate on 
bonds, % 
Measure the cost of 
financing for a country 
( - ) 
Bailouts, log Measure the effect of 
financial assistance 
( + ) 
 
During our analysis, we proceed to a Breusch-Pagan test with the aim to highlight 
heteroscedasticity. The banking literature predicts heteroscedasticity in banking 
analysis in panel data, and heteroscedasticity has been detected in our analysis. In 
keeping with that, we do a Wooldridge test to highlight the first-order autocorrelation, 
which is inherent to panel data analysis. In order to deal with the autocorrelation, we 
use the function “xtregar” which “fits cross-sectional time series regression models 
when the disturbance term is first-order autoregressive” (Manual 13 Stata). As a 
robustness test, we implement the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator 
developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). We do it in 
order to avoid endogeneity and to corroborate our finding. Moreover, the system-
GMM estimator provides a Sargan test to detect over-identification. We estimate the 
following equation for the GMM estimator: 
 
As mentioned above we carry out an OLS regression for all the sample, and then for our 
three specifics countries. We do the same regarding the sample of the countries which 
benefit from the assistance programmes, including these programmes into the analysis. 
There are two OLS regressions, one regarding the bank-specific factors and then all 
the factors including the banking industry ones and the macroeconomic factors. 
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Then we carry out a fixed effects regression with temporarily and individuals’ effects. 
On the other hand, we carry out a random-effects regression. Then, in order to choose 
the specialization of the model we implement a Hausman test. In our case, and not 
totally in agreement with the literature, we find the random effect in our regressions. 
Uhde and Heimeshoff (2009) found the same effect in their previous study. 
 
In order to test for heteroskedasticity, we carry out a Breuch-Pagan test, which has 
been detected. In addition, we also carry out a Wooldridge test for autocorrelation, 
which indicates the presence of first-order serial correlation within each panel. 
Therefore, we use cluster-robust standard errors in our analysis in order to correct for 
both heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. 
 
Finally, to improve our analysis, and to deal with endogeneity and autocorrelation, we 
carry out a system GMM estimator, keeping in mind the usual shortcomings, which 




     4.1   Entire sample analysis 
 
We present the main empirical results in Table 2. Regression (1) is the first OLS 
estimator including bank-specific factors. Regression (2) reports results assessing the 
impact of banking industry factors and macroeconomic factors on the financial 
soundness as measured by the z- score technique. Regression (3) is the robust random-
effect regression, specified by the Hausman test, using the same factors of regression 
(2). Finally, as a robustness check, we have the regression (4), which uses a system-
GMM estimator. 
 
4.4.1. Main findings:  As we are carrying out an empirical analysis on panel data, we 
focus on the interpretation of the results of regression (3), corresponding to the robust 
random-effects regression, presented in Table 2. 
 
The ratio loans on total assets represent our proxy for the asset structure. As explained 
in section 2 and in agreement we the previous literature, our expectations are 
ambiguous. An increase in the ratio can improve the profitability of banks, but at the 
same time increase the liquidity risk. Our results give us a significant, at 1%, and a 
negative relationship with the z-score, which agrees with the findings of Demirgüç-
Kant and Huizinga (1999). Despite increasing the profitability, the increase of this 
ratio deteriorates the financial soundness of the banking system. Then we can conclude 
that the resurrection of the banking system of our sample is not supported by an 
increase of the shares of the loans in the total asset. This period is characterized by a 
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Table 2. Determinants of the Banks Resurrection in the whole Sample 
 
The analysis of the asset quality through the loan loss provision yields significant 
results. Our finding assumes that there is a negative relationship between loan loss 
provision and financial soundness, which corroborate the findings of Udhe and 
Heimesshoff (2009) and Trujillo- Ponce (2013). Our hypothesis about this 
characteristic was ambiguous. Firstly, we argued that the relationship was negative, 
knowing that an increase in the doubtful assets requires to allocate a higher portion of 
margin to provision to cover the expected losses. We mitigate our reflection 
considering the contribution of Trujillo-Ponce (2012) and Mester (1995) who explain 
that higher quality loans imply more resources dedicated to loans monitoring and credit 
underwriting. Even if this last argument can, in fact, increase profitability, we show 
that the deterioration of the asset quality is a burden for the restructuring of banks. 
Moreover, the five countries of our sample were exposed to a high and strong increase 
of non-performing-loans (see appendix 5 Figure), which can justify the 
implementation of rigorous loans monitoring. 
 
Our next finding relates to the capitalization of banks. In agreement with our 
hypothesis, there is a positive and significant relationship between the bulk of equity 
and financial soundness. Therefore, our findings are in line with the evolution of the 
Basel agreement, which requires an increase in bank capitalization to avoid banking 
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fragility. A higher level of equity makes banks, and then the whole banking system 
stronger. However, it must be highlighted that a too high level of capitalization can 
lead to decrease the efficiency because of the opportunity cost. This finding agrees 
with the banking literature, among these findings are Căpraru and Ihnatov (2014), 
Trujillo-Ponce (2012), Petria et al. (2015), Demirgüç-Kant and Huizinga (1999). 
As expected, the cost to income ratio has a significant negative impact on the financial 
soundness, even if it is very low. This finding indicates that the operational efficiency 
on cost has a positive impact on banks’ financial soundness. This result agrees with 
the literature as shown by Uhde and Heimeshoff (2009) and Căpraru and Ihnatov 
(2014). This finding allows us to state that an improvement of operational efficiency 
is necessary to improve financial soundness. 
 
The coefficient of the banks’ size provides us with an interesting result. We find a 
negative and significant relationship between banks’ size and financial soundness. In 
spite of the economies of scale, it seems that larger banks show higher fragility. That 
can be due to the average cost curve with a U-shape, as explained by Athanasoglou et 
al. (2008) and De Young and Rice (2003). Moreover, larger banks can achieve lower 
performance than medium and smaller banks because they cannot reduce the 
asymmetric information as well (Barros et al., 2007). 
 
Regarding the interest expenses and incomes, results seem to agree with our 
hypothesis. The interest incomes have a positive significant relationship with the z-
score measure, which predicts that the strength of banks is backed by interest income. 
On the other hand, the interest expenses show a negative sign but don’t have any 
significant level. 
 
The ratio of customer deposits to total assets gives us a way to analyze the financial 
structure of the balance sheet. As we explain above, and in agreement with the previous 
literature, we expect ambiguous results for this factor. Despite that customer deposits 
are cheap and stable in a context of “deposit war”, in order to attract deposits, banks 
can cut their margins. Our empirical analysis provides us with a positive, and 
significant, at a 5% level, the relationship between customers’ deposit and the z- score. 
That means that stable and cheap financing in a case of financial instability plays a 
significant part in the recovery of the banking systems. Then, we can deduce that the 
customers’ deposits reinforce the banks’ financial structure and helped to make them 
stronger. As a measure of the concentration, we use, as explained above, the HHI. We find 
a highly significant and positive relationship with the financial soundness, which shows that 
a more concentrated banking industry have, fewer weaknesses than a non-concentrated 
market.  
 
About the relationship between concentration and financial soundness, the banking 
literature is split in two. Our findings agree with the study by Beck et al. (2006) but in 
disagreement with the empirical research of De Nicolo et al. (2004) and Uhde and 
Heimeshoff (2009) who find a negative relation. However, we can assume that a more 
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concentrate industry may enhance profits and reduce financial fragility by providing 
“capital buffer” that protect them in case of external chocs. 
 
The second banking industry indicator is size. It appears to have a negative role in 
financial soundness, with a negative and significant coefficient. We can interpret that 
if the banking industry is too important compared with the rest of the economy there is 
a higher risk of financial soundness. The evolution of the banking industry must keep 
in line with the evolution of the economy. If the banking industry grows more than the 
economy, we can then expect a misalignment with the real economy. 
 
Regarding the global factors, results are not as revealing as the bank-specific factors. 
Firstly, the GDP factors, the growth of GDP and the GDP per capita are admittedly 
positive but not significant at all. Concerning the GDP per capita, Uhde and 
Heimeshoff (2009) and Căpraru and Ihnatov (2014) also found non-significant results, 
which is corroborated by our study contrary to Demirgüç-Kant and Huizinga (1999) 
who find a strong and positive relationship. Nevertheless, regarding the rate of real 
GDP, Trujillo-Ponce (2013) find a significant and positive relationship contrary to 
Demirgüç-Kant and Huizinga (1999) who find a non-significant relationship. 
 
We initially set out the hypothesis of a positive relationship between inflation and 
financial soundness. Our results show us an inverse relationship, which is significantly 
negative at the 1% level. This result is not in agreement with the main literature by 
Trujillo-Ponce (2013), Miguélez (2018) and Căpraru and Ihnatov (2014), which 
predicts a positive relationship. Nevertheless, Uhde and Heimeshoff (2009) also find 
a negative relationship between inflation and financial soundness. Then, we suppose 
that the banks in our sample do not fully anticipate the inflation, which impacts their 
profitability and thus their financial soundness. 
 
As a proxy for interest rates, we use the interest rate on the main refinancing operations 
(MRO). We make the hypothesis of a positive relationship with our dependent 
variable, and our result corroborates it, albeit only at the 10% level. The period of the 
study is characterised by an environment of low interest rates, with a constant decrease 
of the MRO (see appendix 3 Figure).  
 
We can make the hypothesis that in this context, banks take advantage of this 
environment to increase their soundness, even if some previous literature argue that 
banks couldn’t establish the appropriate prices for their loans and deposit as suggested 
by Trujillo-Ponce (2013). Despite this, our findings agree with the banking literature, 
which reports a positive association as per Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) 
results. Our last macroeconomic factor is the interest rate on the 10-year sovereign 
bond. The result regarding this factor agrees with our hypothesis. We find a negative 
relationship between the interest rates on sovereign bond and financial soundness. 
That implies a strengthening financial system linked to a stable situation for the 
country. If markets expect higher risk for countries, there will be a decrease in the 
financial soundness and vice versa. Healthy finances for the government is required 
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to strengthen the banking system. Interest rates on a bond of each country are 
presented in figures Appendix 4. Moreover, in the countries where the state has the 
role of “lender of the last resort” a healthy financial system is required to set the 
credibility of this role. This finding agrees with the results of Molyneux and Thornton 
(1992). 
 
As explained above we also estimate a GMM system, as a robustness check and to 
deal especially with endogeneity. The findings are broadly consistent with those 
obtained above. Coefficients show the same signs and almost always the same 
significances levels. Notice that there are few differences. The coefficient of the 
customers’ deposits become negative and highly significant with this new regression.  
 
This can mean that the “deposit-war” conducted by the banks could have been harmful 
to their financial soundness, competing “too hard” between them to get more deposits. 
The non- interest incomes show a negative coefficient but contrary at the previous 
regression it becomes significant but at a weak level of 10%, which indicates that 
revenue diversification could have been detrimental. Regarding inflation, the 
coefficient is still negative but only weakly significant. The GMM test provides a Sargan 
test, which tests the hypothesis of over-identified restrictions. The result gives us a p-
value of 0.864, which means that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that our 
overidentifying restrictions are valid. 
    
4.5 Analysis conduct on specific countries (Italy, Portugal and Spain) 
 
As for the entire sample, we first run two OLS regressions, the first one with bank-
specific factors and then with all the factors included. We then run another two 
regressions, one with Fixed Effects and one with Random Effects, using cluster-robust 
standard errors. To specify our model, we use a Hausman test. As previously, a GMM 
estimator is implemented as a robustness check. 
 
4.5.1 Main Results for Italy: We present the main results for Italy in Table 3. As in 
the regression of the whole sample, the Hausman test suggests that the Random Effects 
model should be employed. Our findings are like the previous analysis. We will discuss 
the key factors, while also presenting the main differences. The improvement of the 
Italian banking system does not seem to be supported by the customers’ deposits. In 
fact, this factor becomes non-significant in the analysis of the Italian banks. The 
financial structure of these banks can be based on stable financing, but it does not seem 
to strengthen the banking industry. 
 
Regarding the interest expenses and income, there appear to be some differences. The 
interest expenses have a negative sign as expected and are strong significance contrary 
to our first analysis. This means that the interest expenses had some play in the strong 
and negative role in making the Italian banking system better.  
 
 
Establishing the Contributing Factors to the Resurrection of PIIGS Banks Following the 
Crisis: A Panel Data Analysis 
22 
Table 3. Determinants of the Banks Resurrection in Italy  
 
 
Italian banks should have higher management of their interest expenses to decrease 
their vulnerability. On the other hand, the interest income still shows positive results 
but at a weak level of significance (10%). 
 
For the measure of concentration, where we use the HHI, the coefficient is now non-
significant, which suggests the absence of a relationship between concentration and 
the welfare of the banking industry. Since 2008, we can observe an increase in 
concentration in the Italian banking industry, certainly owed to the fusion or purchase 
from one bank to the other but also by the bankruptcies. Despite this, the concentration 
is still at a low level with a maximum value of 0.0452 during our period analysed. 
 
In our whole sample, as explained in the previous section, the size of the banking 
industry has a negative relationship with financial soundness. In the analysis of the 
Italian banks, this factor becomes positive but non-significant. We can then state that 
the size of the banking sector in Italy does not affect its soundness. One interesting 
result is regarding inflation. Opposite to the first analysis and in agreement with our 
hypothesis, we find here a positive relationship between inflation and financial 
soundness, which suggests that inflation is good support for banks.  
 
The interest rate on the ten-year bonds in Italy have a negative coefficient. This means 
if the risk of the country increases, which is reflected in its interest rate on 10-year 
bonds, the financial soundness of the banking system will decrease and vice versa. 
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Notice that this coefficient shows a weak significant level of 10%. Regarding the other 
macroeconomic factors of the Italian banks, none of them yields significant results. 
We can state that the recuperation of the Italian banking system is owed to managerial 
factors. The macroeconomic factors and the banking industry factors, apart from the 
inflation and the interest rate on bonds, did not seem to have had any influence on the 
resurrection. With respect to the size of the bank, GDP growth rate, GDP per capita, 
loan loss provision, equity, the cost to income ratio, asset structure, revenue 
diversification and the MRO, the results obtained are similar in terms of sign and 
significance to the regression of the whole sample. 
 
The GMM estimator corroborates most of the findings for Italy. However, there still 
are some differences as to the size of the banks, with the coefficient now becoming 
non-significant. The effect of the interest income becomes five times stronger and with 
a higher level of significance. For the macroeconomic factors, the only one which is 
still marginally significant at a level of 10% is inflation. 
 
4.5.2 Main Results for Portugal: We present the main result for Portugal in Table 4. 
The Hausman test suggests using a Random Effects model. Unlike the previous 
regressions, results regarding Portugal are significantly poor. This can be due to a lack 
of variation or misspecification of the model for this country, coupled with a small 
sample size of only 57 observations, the lowest of any country. Moreover, the Sargan 
test suggests an over-identified model. 
The cost to income ratio shows, as expected, a negative and significant relationship 
with our proxy of financial soundness. This result agrees with the findings in Italy and 
the whole sample analysis. The loss loan provision, as suggested before, highlights 
that a higher amount of provision deteriorates the strengthening of the Portuguese 
banking system. Regarding the customer deposits, we find, as in Italy, a negative 
relationship, which is surprising, knowing that this is a stable and cheap way 
of financing. The other factors in the analysis of the Portuguese banks are not 
significant. 
 
4.5.3 Main Results for Spain: Results for Spain are presented in Table 5. With a 
sample of 174 observations, the results are closer to those obtained in Italy than 
Portugal. The amelioration in the banking system in this country does not seem to be 
supported by the customers’ deposits. This factor becomes negative in the case of the 
Spanish banks and highly significant. The financial structure of these banks is thus not 
based on this stable financing. In agreement with our hypothesis, which hypothesised 
an ambiguous effect, we can state that the Spanish banking system was in a “deposit-
war” context in order to lure deposits. Banks decided to increase the remuneration of 
the deposits which have to weaken the financial soundness. The cost of income ratio 
provides us with the same nexus as previously, which is negative, but with a low 
degree of significance, established at 10%. The measure of the concentration, through 
the HHI, gives us the surprising result. We find a positive and significant relation with 
the z-score. Notice that, it is surprising because the value of the coefficient is 1,165.5. 
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Table 4. Determinants of the Banks Resurrection in Portugal 
 
The coefficient lets us circumspect and we are prudent regarding the analysis of these 
finding. Nevertheless, the Spanish banking industry is a bit different from the other 
countries. It is composed of a high number of savings banks - the so-called cajas – 
created in the 19th century as non-profit entities (Trujillo-Ponce, 2013). In fact, Spain 
has the largest number of bank branches per capita in Europe. Nowadays, these cajas 
operate as traditional commercial banks, but act as local banks and focus their activity 
on local activities. During the 2000 decade, they started to operate out of their regional 
area, going to foreign markets. In doing this, they faced high losses, which highlight the 
considerable risk taken by these banks. Most of them have been absorbed by other 
banking groups, reducing their number considerably during an important restructuring 
process. Therefore, it is highly probable that this process enhanced the overall 
financial soundness, even though this coefficient seems exaggerated in comparison 
with the analysis of other countries. The size of the sector is in complete opposition 
with what we have found previously. In the case of the Spanish banks, it is seen that a 
wide banking industry provides an amelioration of the banking strength. The 
coefficient is positive, high and significant and as for the concentration, the coefficient 
seems to be high, 90.198. Contrary to the analysis of the whole sample, in the case of 
Spain, all the macroeconomic factors are significant. The role of inflation agrees with 
our hypothesis. We find a positive and significant, at the 5% level, correlation with 
the financial soundness. 
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Table 5. Determinants of the Banks Resurrection in Spain 
 
 
We can interpret that Spanish banks have good anticipation of the inflation and then can 
set their interest rates on loans and deposits in agreement with that. Notice that the 
value of the coefficient is 13.07 which seems to be higher with respect to the findings 
in the previous literature, by Căpraru and Ihnatov (2014) and Uhde and Heimeshoff 
(2009). The growth of the real GDP penalizes the financial soundness in Spain, where 
we find a negative and significant coefficient. Again, this result looks surprising for us 
where we expected that an increase of the GDP would lead to higher financial 
soundness since banks would be evolving in a better environment. 
 
Nevertheless, the measure of the GDP per capita, which seems to us a better measure 
of wealth, shows a positive relationship between the factors and the financial 
soundness. This finding suggests that banks evolving in a more developed 
environment exhibit higher financial soundness. Notice that the value of this 
coefficient is very high, 168.112, which is surprising. The other factors as the total of 
loans, the assets quality, the capitalization, the size, the revenue diversification, the 
interest management, the MRO and the 10-years bonds yields present similar 
characteristics to the findings of the whole sample. In the analysis of Spain, the GMM 
estimator provides us with interesting results.  
 
Firstly, the coefficient regarding the loans becomes non-significant, which mitigate 
the fact that loans have been detrimental for the financial soundness. For the interest 
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expenses, the coefficient is still negative but becomes significant at a level of 5%, which 
agrees with our hypothesis. Previously, we mentioned how both the coefficient of the 
measure of the concentration, the HHI, and of the GDP per capita had a surprisingly 
high value. The GMM estimator eliminated these two factors of the analysis. This can 
be because the Sargan test specified an over-identified model. We can then note that 
these factors were biasing the regression. 
 
4.6 Analysis of the regression of the four countries that had benefited from 
assistance programmes 
 
This part of the study focusses on the four countries, Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain 
that have benefited from financial assistance programmes. Results are presented in 
Table 6. In line with the banking literature, we run the same regression as in the 
analysis of the whole sample including the natural logarithm of the amounts received 
from the programmes for each country and per year. These programmes are divided 
into different loans tranches and since we use yearly data, we do the sum of the loans 
per year. We consider the assistance programmes from the European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The results regarding the 
bank-specific factors are almost identical to those obtained previously. Nevertheless, 
here are some differences in the analysis of the whole sample. 
 
We notice that, contrary to the analysis of the whole sample, customer deposits have 
a negative effect on financial soundness, which again, is somewhat surprising. In the 
analysis of these four countries, it seems that the customer deposits have been 
detrimental for financial soundness. This can be since banks were operating in the 
context of a “deposit-war” which decreased their profitability. The factors regarding 
the banking industry also give us different results. The size of the sector still 
shows a negative sign but becomes non-significant. The measure of 
concentration, which had a positive and strong significant coefficient in the 
regression of the whole sample, became non-significant in the analyses of these 
countries. The banking sector factors don’t seem to have played an important 
role in the restructuring of the banking systems of these countries. 
 
The results about the macroeconomic factors are also quite different. Inflation still has 
a negative coefficient, but the significance level has increased to 1%. We can then 
assume that inflation as for the whole sample is not fully anticipated. Moreover, the 
context of very low inflation could have been detrimental for the banks in preventing 
a good set of interest rates. Contrary to our first analysis, the rate of growth of the real 
GDP is statistically significant at the 5% level, in agreement with our hypothesis. For 
these four countries during the period studied, we can observe an improvement in 
growth after the important drop following the crisis of 2008 (see appendix 2 Figure). 
Economic growth should have helped banks improve their financial soundness, in line 
with ameliorating economic conditions. 
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The coefficients on interest rates, such as the MRO or the interest rates on 10-years 
bonds, are now not significant. Nevertheless, in this part of the study, we focused on 
the effect of financial assistance which provides us with an interesting result. We find 
that the assistance programmes have been beneficial for financial soundness. The 
coefficient is positive and significant at a 5% level. This finding agrees with our 
expectations, as these programmes have been made to reinforce the financial 
situations of these countries and of their banking systems through bailouts. These 
programmes have been important for financial soundness and participated in the 
resurrection of the banking systems of these four countries. As mention above, 
previous literature as seen in Van der Kwaak and Van Wijnbergen (2017), explain 
how if the bailouts are financed by their own country it can be detrimental for the 
sovereign debt as well as the banking stability. In this case, since the bailouts were 
external to the countries then this may have contributed to their overall success. 
 
Here, the analysis the GMM estimator reinforced our findings. Differences are observed 
in terms of the customer deposits, which became non-significant, and to the growth of 
real GDP which became non-significant. For the other variables, findings are almost 
identical. Moreover, the GMM estimator supports the previous findings regarding the 
financial assistance programmes. 
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5. Summary and conclusions 
 
Using panel data from balance sheet data of 200 banks from five different countries over 
the period between 2011 to 2016, this paper empirically analyses the main factors 
behind the restructure and improvement of the banking systems of these countries after 
the crises of the last decade. We also look for the impact of macroeconomic factors on 
the financial soundness of these five countries. As a contribution to the banking 
literature, we include an analysis of the effect of the financial assistance programmes 
which have characterized this period for four countries in our sample. 
 
Italian, Irish, Greek, Portuguese and Spanish banks have been involved in an economic 
depression since the 2008-09 credit crunch. Nowadays they seem to have risen 
somewhat from the economic slump. The managerial factors are found to have played 
the most important role, with our results showing that this improvement has been led 
by a better capitalization of banks, which increases their resistance to external 
shocks. We attribute this characteristic to the fact that banks are now required to 
submit to macro-recommendations by the Basel III as transposed in the European 
Capital Requirement Directives. The analysis of the financial structure highlights that 
banks’ source of finance is based on customer deposits, which represent cheap and 
stable financing. Nevertheless, the study of the specific countries shows that for some of 
them the customer deposits could have been detrimental. We argue that this situation 
is owed to a “deposit-war” between banks to attract deposits as much as possible, 
which may have had a detrimental impact on their profitability. The decrease in the 
loans, which characterized this period seems to have had a positive impact on financial 
soundness, as did increased monitoring on credit. Moreover, the decrease of credit in 
the balance sheet also decreased the liquidity risk correlated with this factor. In 
agreement with that, the loan loss provision shows a negative relation which 
emphasizes that loan monitoring and credit underwriting are necessary. 
 
On the other hand, some factors have been detrimental for the banks in our sample. 
The size of banks decreases the financial soundness, which implies that control and a 
limitation on banks’ size by public authorities is necessary to ensure financial stability, 
despite the economies of scale that they can show. In agreement with the previous 
literature, and the previous deduction regarding credit, smaller and medium banks are 
more able to avoid asymmetric information, which in a high default credit context is 
very important. The results also show that a disproportionately large banking industry 
in comparison with the whole economy of a country is detrimental. The size of the 
banking industry and the whole economy should progress at the same rhythm. This 
can permit the avoidance of a bubble in for example credit. The banking industry must 
go along with the real economy, which is mutually beneficial for both. 
 
Our results show that a more concentrated market helps to ensure higher financial 
soundness. In the five countries of our sample, we observe an increase in concentration 
during the period of study. This finding could be in opposition to the previous 
statement, which highlighted that large banks can be detrimental to the soundness of 
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the economy. These two findings lead us to the conclusion that medium banks are 
perhaps the most efficient for banking stability, with the presence of very small or very large 
banks harming financial soundness. Inflation has played a negative role in the 
resurrection of the banking systems. This result indicates weak anticipation of inflation, 
which in turn was detrimental for banks. Moreover, in the context of very low inflation, 
(close to zero), it is more difficult for the bank to set accurate interest rates, as they 
should expect at one moment an increase in the inflation, which can be detrimental for 
them. Following these findings, the results show that the Main Refinancing Operation 
rate is positively correlated with financial soundness. As our period of study has been 
characterized by a decrease in this interest rate, it may have been detrimental for 
financial soundness. In this context, it is difficult for banks to set the interest rate on 
loans and deposits in order to increase their profitability. Notice that this low-interest 
rate has enabled the avoidance of illiquidity risk, allowed by cheap financing. 
 
With regards to other measures of interest rate, the 10-year sovereign bonds of each 
country exhibit a negative relationship with financial soundness. Our findings agree 
with the previous literature, which leads us to believe that an enhancement in public 
sector finances is necessary to improve banking soundness. If the fiscal situation of the 
country is weak, the government cannot ensure the stability of the banking system in 
case of a shock. 
 
Finally, our study reveals and confirms our hypothesis that financial assistance 
programmes have been beneficial to improve the stability of the banking system, 
which was necessary to start the resurrection. The financial assistance had a positive 
effect because it came from other international institutions and not directly from within 
each country, which were already in an economic slump. Even if we observe an 
improvement and a strengthening of the banking systems in these countries, caution is 
warranted. Although crises seem to be behind us for the moment, it is imperative to 
exercise vigilance in order to maintain stability improvement. Banks’ managers are 
nowadays more cautious, but there is no guarantee that such behaviour will persist in 
the long run. This is why public authorities must keep a close eye on the financial 
situation within a country and take necessary and timely action to enforce banking 
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Appendix 1: Total Loans for Households (Right) and Corporates (Left) 


















Appendix 3: Rate of the main refinancing operation of the European Central Bank 
 
Source: European Central Bank, 2018. 
 
Appendix 4: The Interest rate on a 10-year bond for each currency. (Eikon), 2018 
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Appendix 5: Banks non-performing loans to total gross loans 
 
Source: World Bank database, 2018. 
